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THE CONTINUING REFINEMENT OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE:  
R, PETITIONER 
 
The previous two years have provided fertile ground for judicial 
consideration of habitual residence. Since September 2013 the connecting 
factor has been considered twice by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union1 and four times by the Supreme Court,2 with these judgments 
followed by a plethora of decisions from the lower courts, particularly the 
Family Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, in which 
the question of habitual residence has been considered in myriad factual 
circumstances. The principal focus of this analysis is the recent judgment 
of the Supreme Court in the Scottish case of R, Petitioner3 but in order 
fully to understand the context in which this decision was made it is 
necessary first to consider the development of the law in the three earlier 
judgments of the Supreme Court, particularly that of A v A. 
 
A. A v A 
 
Between September 2013 and January 2014 the Supreme Court handed 
down three judgments which, while considering very different factual 
circumstances, all dealt with the question of how the habitual residence of 
a child was to be determined.4 The most influential of these judgments 
has been that handed down first, A v A and another (Children: Habitual 
Residence).5 While this case was ultimately disposed of on other grounds,6 
the judgment nevertheless provides a detailed consideration of the law 
pertaining to habitual residence. In particular, the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to clarify that habitual residence was intended to be, and 
should be interpreted contemporarily as, a factual concept, free from 
judicial gloss and the type of technical legal rules which so bedevil the 
determination of domicile.7 Such a factual interpretation was to be 
achieved via a rejection of the approach which had developed following 
the earlier House of Lords decision in R v Barnet London Borough Council, 
                                       
1 Case C-436/13 E v B [2015] Fam 162 and Case C-376/14PPU C v M [2015] Fam 
116. 
2 A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60, [2014] AC 
1; Re L (A Child) (Custody: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 75, [2014] AC 
1017; Re LC (Children) [2014] UKSC 1, [2014] AC 1038 and R, Petitioner [2015] 
UKSC 35, 2015 SLT 392. In addition, the Supreme Court recently handed down a 
judgment concerned with the meaning of ordinary residence: R (on the 
application of Cornwall Council) v Secretary of State for Health [2015] UKSC 46. 
3 R, Petitioner [2015] UKSC 35, 2015 Fam LR 54. 
4 A more detailed consideration of all three cases can be found in D Williams, “The 
Supreme Court trilogy: a new habitual residence rises!” [2014] IFL 84 and R 
Schuz, “Habitual residence of the child revisited: a trilogy of cases in the UK 
Supreme Court” (2014) 26 CFLQ 342. 
5 See further, D Hill, “Habitual residence in the Supreme Court” (2014) 36 JSWFL 
211. 
6 In A v A the question as to whether the English courts had jurisdiction over the 
child at the centre of the dispute was determined with reference to nationality 
rather than habitual residence. 
7 At paras 36 and 54 per Baroness Hale. This approach was confirmed in the two 
subsequent cases of Re L and Re LC. 
Ex p Nilish Shah,8 in which elements of the concept of ordinary residence 
were transposed onto the understanding of habitual residence,9 a 
clarification of the precise effect of Lord Brandon of Oakbrook’s seminal 
judgment in Re J (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights),10 and an 
adoption of the test propounded by the CJEU that the habitual residence 
of a child will be in “the place which reflects some degree of integration by 
the child in a social and family environment”.11 
 This principle of favouring a factual, child-focussed approach led 
both Baroness Hale and Lord Hughes to criticise the development of the 
‘rule’ that, where parents have equivalent rights, one parent would be 
unable to effect a change in a child’s habitual residence through unilateral 
actions if such actions were not supported by the other parent.12 Although 
no final conclusion was reached on this point due to the issue not being 
before the court, the view of the Supreme Court was later confirmed in 
the Court of Appeal decision of Re H (Children), with Black LJ stating that 
“I would now consign the ‘rule’, whether it was truly a binding rule or 
whether it was just a well-established method of approaching cases, to 
history”.13  
     
 
B. R, PETITIONER 
 
R, Petitioner involved the not uncommon situation of a family unit being 
fragmented across two jurisdictions. The mother, a British and Canadian 
citizen who had been born in Canada to a Scottish mother, lived in France 
with her French partner. The couple had two children, both of whom were 
born in France, and the family lived together in France until July 2013. It 
was in this month that the mother and the children, the elder being just 
under three years old, the younger having been born the previous month, 
relocated to Scotland, with the father’s agreement, so that they could 
spend the twelve months of the mother’s maternity leave close to her 
parents, who now lived in Scotland.  
Following the mother’s discovery of the father’s infidelity in 
November 2013 she ended their relationship and launched proceedings in 
Scotland seeking a residence order in respect of the children and an 
interdict against the father removing them from Scotland. In response, 
the father sought an order under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 
1985 for the children’s return to France on the basis that the mother’s 
actions constituted the wrongful retention of the children under article 3 of 
the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction. Essential to the father’s case was that, for the retention to be 
considered wrongful, the children must have retained their habitual 
residence in France. At first instance the Lord Ordinary considered that 
                                       
8 [1983] 2 AC 309. 
9 At para 54 per Baroness Hale. 
10 [1990] 2 AC 562. 
11 Case C-523/07 Proceedings Brought by A [2010] Fam 42 at para 44 and Case 
C-497/10PPU Mercredi v Chaffe [2012] Fam 22 at para 56. 
12 At paras 39-40 per Baroness Hale and paras 76-79 per Lord Hughes. 
13 Re H (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1101, [2015] 1 WLR 863 para 34 per Black 
LJ. 
the children had not lost their habitual residence in France. This decision 
was reversed by an Extra Division of the Inner House of the Court of 
Session which held that the children had lost their habitual residence in 
France and were now habitually resident in Scotland.14 On appeal to the 
Supreme Court the decision of the Court of Session was affirmed with the 
father’s appeal dismissed on the basis that, as the children were now 
habitually resident in Scotland, they had not been retained wrongfully. 
 
C. PARENTAL INTENT 
 
R, Petitioner provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to consider 
the relevance of parental intent in the determination of a child’s habitual 
residence, an issue previously discussed in A v A and now crucial in the 
disposal of the present case. In holding that the Lord Ordinary at first 
instance had erred in finding the absence of a joint parental intent to 
reside permanently in Scotland as determinative, and by approving the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Re H (Children), the Supreme Court has 
removed any last vestiges of the no unilateral change ‘rule’ from a 
contemporary understanding of habitual residence.15  
This finding is unsurprising when considered in the overarching 
context of the desire to return habitual residence to its factual origins but 
this does not mean that parental intentions no longer have a role to play. 
Instead, parental intentions will be a relevant factor, albeit not the only 
relevant factor.16 This approach does, however, raise as a corollary the 
question of just how relevant is relevant? Where children are young, such 
as in R, Petitioner, it could reasonably be expected that parental 
intentions will take on a greater relevance but in this case the father’s 
intentions appear to have been of only minimal relevance when weighed 
against other factors. Ultimately, the answer to this question is one that 
will depend very much of the facts of the particular case, as is the nature 
of habitual residence, therefore adding an extra layer of complexity to 
what can already be a laborious process, complexity which, for all its 
attendant criticisms, is not present under an approach whereby one 
parent is normally unable to change the habitual residence of a child 
unilaterally.17 
 
D. THE CORRECT DECISION?*** 
 
The assessment of habitual residence can arise in a multitude of factual 
situations. R, Petitioner presented the question in the difficult context of a 
move which, while agreed to by both parents, was somewhat tentative in 
that it was subject to a specific time period and the views of the parents 
diverged as to what would occur at the end of this period. In affirming the 
approach of the Court of Session in finding that the children had become 
                                       
14 [2014] CSIH 95, 2014 SLT 1080. 
15 Para 17. 
16 Para 21. 
17 While noting the developments in the UK Supreme Court, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed an approach whereby shared 
parental intent is a key, if not always dispositive, consideration in Murphy v Sloan 
764 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
habitually resident in Scotland after four months of the agreed twelve 
month period the Supreme Court has continued to espouse a child centred 
approach in which parental intentions remain a relevant, but potentially 
marginalised, consideration. 
 While such an approach has been embraced by commentators,18 it 
is hard not to feel some sympathy for the father upon discovering that, 
after four months of what both parents agreed was likely to be a short-
term relocation to Scotland, his children had become habitually resident in 
that jurisdiction and, consequently, his reliance on the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention was doomed to failure. While four months is not an 
insignificant period in the assessment of habitual residence, particularly in 
light of the comments of Baroness Hale and Lord Hughes in A v A that 
habitual residence could potentially be established at the time of arrival in 
a country,19 it is a factor that must be understood in the broader context. 
Thus, the reasons for the residence in the country in question and, if 
appropriate, parental intentions will both necessarily affect the integration 
of the child, particularly when this question is asked following a relatively 
short period of residence.  
The Lord Ordinary at first instance clearly erred by treating the 
absence of proof of a joint decision to leave France and settle permanently 
in Scotland as an absolute bar to the acquisition of a Scottish habitual 
residence. However, it is submitted that the Court of Session tipped the 
balance too far in the opposite direction in finding that the children had 
become integrated in Scotland after four months20 in light of the particular 
circumstances of the case.21 Instead, a more realistic finding in light of the 
evidence provided by each parent could perhaps have been that the 
children had no habitual residence at the point the question was raised in 
November 2013, it being apparent that the family wished to leave France 
but remained undecided as to a final location. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court has reiterated in R, Petitioner that the question 
of habitual residence is a factual one which seeks to identify the place in 
which the child is integrated into a social and family environment without 
recourse to artificial legal rules. A central tenet of this approach is the 
rejection of the idea that parental intent can absolutely be determinative 
with regard to the loss or acquisition of habitual residence. However, 
courts must bear in mind that, although not determinative, parental 
intentions are still relevant and must be weighed appropriately along with 
                                       
18 For example, Schuz (n 4) at 360 describes the approach as a “logical 
progression…and is to be warmly welcomed”. 
19 A v A at para 44 per Baroness Hale and para 74 per Lord Hughes. See also E M 
Clive, “The Concept of Habitual Residence” [1997] JR 137 at 142-146. 
20 Indeed, in its judgment the Court of Session hints that the same answer would 
have been reached if the question was asked after two months (para 14). 
21 This decision can be compared with the older Scottish case of Cameron v 
Cameron 1996 SC 17 in which two children were found to be habitually resident 
in France after three months but in the context of much stronger evidence that 
the stay in France was intended to be permanent and to extend indefinitely for a 
number of years. 
all other material factors. As the Supreme Court acknowledged,22 there 
were sound policy reasons underlying the no unilateral change rule and it 
is important that these practical reasons are not lost in the drive towards 
a more child centred assessment.23 
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22 A v A at paras 76-78 per Lord Hughes. 
23 Professor McEleavy has argued that in certain circumstances parents should be 
able to reach a formalised agreement which would fix a child’s habitual residence 
for 12/18 months in particular circumstances: P McEleavy, “A protocol for the 
1980 Hague Convention?” [2010] IFL 59 at 65.  
